As of the moment I am writing this, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has stretched on for four months, three weeks, and five days. According to President Zelensky, 20% of the nation is under Russian control. 5,000 miles away, the United States of America grapples with what increasingly appears to be the worst constitutional scandal in the history of our great nation. On the surface, these issues seem to have little in common with each other, but both scenarios stem from the same undercurrent, one that is little talked about and one that connects both to an infamous essay published in the summer of 1989 in the National Interest.
Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History proved to encapsulate the defining ideology of the West for 30 years; history was all but finished, and liberal democracy stood atop its ruins as the victor. The triumphalism that dominated western foreign policy in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse was justifiable. After all, the world had been near the precipice for nearly 50 years up to that point. Liberal democracy, in the span of 60 years, had defeated both fascism and communism in two very different ways. The world leaders in charge of building what George H.W. Bush termed the “new world order” believed, rightfully so, that this victory was worth celebrating. 33 years later, history certainly does not seem dead. Russia is on the march. An increasingly authoritarian China seems poised to broaden its reach outside of Southeast Asia. The Western world has been caught flat-footed and is unprepared and in many cases unwilling to confront these issues.
On the other side of this issue stands the January 6th insurrection. Donald Trump, in a brazen attempt to seize power through unconstitutional means, coerced and cajoled a mob into storming the Capitol Building, threatening the lives of Congress and doing serious damage to our constitutional fabric. This attack on American institutions has left America on the edge of turmoil. The nation is polarized in a way it hasn’t been in decades, and it is unclear that, in the short term, any depolarization will happen. That a nation with such a rich, democratic and liberal history as the United States could have something like January 6th happen is proof of some deeper problem.
That problem, as was alluded to earlier, is that, for too long, too many people have bought into the idea that certain aspects of history are inevitable. The belief that the arc of history bends in one direction or another is a popular one.
It is also not true. History does not trend by itself. Historical progression is not absolute; there is no hidden history book that has its entire course mapped out. History, every moment of it, has a causality outside of history itself. That history has trended in a certain direction—in the direction of liberal democracy, or capitalism, for example—is not due to some divinity held by those ideas, or through some unstoppable historical momentum, but by those who have defended and spread them across time. The arc of history does not bend towards liberal democracy—it must be bent towards it by her defenders. The men who led the world post-Cold War did not understand this, and so they became lax with their defenses. Everyone bought into the Fukuyaman idea that liberal democracy was inevitable, and the result has been a global backslide away from liberalism. Fukuyama’s other prophecies, however, have become true, which makes the situation all the more concerning. Russia has seen a return to revanchist fascism, because the West refused to apply pressure when needed. Western Europe, and increasingly the United States, have become passive economic actors, unable and unwilling to defend their ideas in the face of an increasingly bold opposition. At home, American citizens have begun to lose faith in our liberal tradition, and so a man like Donald Trump was allowed to become President and assault our institutions from the White House.
If liberal democracy is to survive, those in charge of protecting it must remember their duty, like their predecessors did 60 years ago. Russia must be defeated in Ukraine, and it must be done through a collective effort of the West as the natural guardians of the liberal ideas they birthed and shared with the world. At home, Donald Trump and his accomplices must face justice for their assault on America’s institutions, or else the assaults with continue. Liberal democracy is a choice that must be made, both at home and abroad. America, as the greatest defender of the West, must wake up and engage with these threats if she is to survive in her current form.
History is flailing, gasping for air, desperate to resurrect itself. The West, with America as her champion, must kill it, or risk unwinding the world order it built and has defended for 70 years now.
Congratulations on your new endeavor. I offer a few points.
Fukuyama's thesis was never that the "West" had won or that history, as understood by political turmoil, would never be seen again. He spoke of a specific "History" as understood by Alexandre Kojeve and his integration of Hegelian concepts. Fukuyama, with uncanny clarity, predicted this present crisis of liberal democracy by warning of a left that would erase the individual and a right that would overly praise the individual. All tied up in a thymos state of nature ideal, which is counter to the Lockean concept. Fukuyama went on to flesh out this idea in his two books about political order.
What you are pointing to is the Marxist view of scientific history which is partially what neoconservatives believed in foreign policy and what social liberals believe in domestic policy. Most people like to think they are on the vanguard of improvement for society because they have all the answers.
A counterview is that Americans never really cared about bringing peace and liberty to every corner of the world. This has been made clear by the authoritarian backsliding of American foreign policy since George W. Bush left office. In part, Presidents are responding to domestic political pressure of an electorate that does not care about foreigners but only the price of their goods. I'm not talking about everyone, but the massive middle of the standard deviation curve. In the end, we are backsliding because America no longer defends its ideals abroad and has retrenched to supporting authoritarian regimes in exchange for commercial ties.
A similar situation is occurring in domestic politics. While a few of us decry whenever an institutional norm is broken, most people don't care. They just want to win. And in a system based on respecting the majority's will, it is inevitable that people will get what they want.